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COMMENTS 
Including Geothermal Resources Within the 
Mineral Estate: The Need for a Statutory 
Rule of Presumption 
The problem of deciding whether a resource recently found 
to be valuable is included within a general conveyance of all the 
mineral rights in a piece of property is not new to the courts. Near 
the turn of the century, for example, courts were asked to decide 
whether oil and gas were "minerals" within the terms of deeds 
and leases.' More recent examples of this process are the efforts 
1. The issue was presented in 1882 in Pennsylvania in the case of Dunham v. Kirkpa- 
trick, 101 Pa. 36 (1882), and the court there concluded that a reservation of all minerals 
did not include petroleum. The court conceded that oil and gas were technically minerals, 
but held that the intent of the parties was not to include them in the reservation of "all 
minerals" since "by the bulk of mankind nothing is considered as a mineral except such 
things as be of a metallic nature, such as gold, silver, copper, lead, etc." Id. a t  44. Since 
then, Pennsylvania has developed a small but consistent line of cases following this view. 
See, e.g., New York State Natural Gas Corp. v. Swan-Fitch Gas Dev. Corp., 173 F. Supp. 
184 (W.D. Pa. 1959); Highland v. Commonwealth, 400 Pa. 261, 161 A.2d 390 (1960); 
Bundy v. Myers, 372 Pa. 583,94 A.2d 724 (1953); Preston v. South Penn Oil Co., 238 Pa. 
301, 86 A. 203 (1913); Silver v. Bush, 213 Pa. 195, 62 A. 832 (1906). 
In situations not involving the intent of the parties, Pennsylvania has consistently 
held oil and gas to be minerals. See Bannard v. New York State Natural Gas Corp., 448 
Pa. 239,293 A.2d 41 (1972) (holding that oil and gas are minerals for purpose of a tax sale); 
Marshall v. Mellon, 179 Pa. 371, 36 A. 201 (1897); Blakley v. Marshall, 174 Pa. 425, 34 A. 
564 (1896) (holding that they are minerals and thus are part of the corpus of the land as 
between life tenants and remaindermen); Gill v. Weston, 110 Pa. 312, 1 A. 921 (1885) 
(holding that they are minerals within the meaning of a statute providing for mortgages 
on mineral property). Consequently Pennsylvania law does not preclude oil and gas from 
being legally recognized as minerals, but has only concluded that oil and gas are not 
popularly understood to be minerals. 
A similar result was reached in Ohio in Detlor v. Holland, 57 Ohio St. 492, 49 N.E. 
690 (1898). But see Jividen v. New Pittsburg Coal Co., 45 Ohio App. 294, 187 N.E. 124 
(1933) (dictum). 
The majority of the states, however, have reached the opposite result, holding that 
absent evidence of a specific intent to the contrary, "all the minefals" includes oil and 
gas. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Zeppa, 199 Ark. 1, 133 S.W.2d 860 (1939); Roth v. Huser, 147 
Kan. 433, 76 P.2d 871 (1938); Scott v. Laws, 185 Ky. 440, 215 S.W. 81 (1919); Weaver v. 
Richards, 156 Mich. 320, 120 N.W. 818 (1909); Barker v. Campbell-Ratcliff Land Co., 64 
Okla. 249, 167 P. 468 (1917); Murray v. Allard, 100 Tenn. 100, 43 S.W. 355 (1897); 
Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co. v. Bruhlmeyer, 134 Tex. 574, 136 S.W.2d 800 (1940); West- 
ern Dev. Co. v. Nell, 4 Utah 2d 112,288 P.2d 452 (1955); Warren v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., 
166 Va. 524, 186 S.E. 20 (1936); Sult v. A. Hochstetter Oil Co., 63 W. Va. 317, 61 S.E. 
307 (1908). 
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of the courts, since the advent of the atomic age, to determine the 
ownership of uranium and thorium deposits. In New Mexico & 
Arizona Land Co. v. Elkinq2 the court reasoned that since ura- 
nium and thorium are minerals in a technical, scientific, and 
geologic sense, they are minerals in a legal sense.3 
The difficulty in these cases arises because the term 
"mineral" is not a term of art, but is, as the Supreme Court has 
recognized, "used in so many senses, dependent upon the con- 
text, that the ordinary definitions of the dictionary throw but 
little light upon its signification in a given case."* While most 
authorities agree that the definition of mineral should not be as 
broad as its strictly technical sense would permit (which would 
include virtually all inorganic  substance^)^ or so narrow as to 
include only precious  metal^,^ within those broad parameters 
there does not appear to be a single unifying principle or talisman 
by which a substance may be readily categorized as mineral or 
nonmineral.' As a result, courts must determine the ownership of 
natural resources by construing individual conveyances and eval- 
uating each new resource as its usefulness is discovered. 
One resource that has recently become valuable is geother- 
mal energy8 With the increased cost and limited reliability of 
petroleum, greater attention has been focused on alternative en- 
ergy sources, including geothermal energy. This increased inter- 
est has raised the issue whether geothermal resources belong to 
the mineral owner or to the surface owner.g Because of the vast 
potential of geothermal resources in the United States, especially 
in the Western States,"' the answer given this question could 
-- - - - 
2. 137 F. Supp. 767 (D.N.M. 1956). 
3. Uranium was also included within the mineral estate in Cain v. Neumann, 316 
S.W.2d 915 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958). 
4. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526, 530 (1903). 
5. See id.; White v. Miller, 200 N.Y. 29,92 N.E. 1065 (1910); Rock House Fork Land 
Co. v. Raleigh Brick & Tile Co., 83 W. Va. 20, 97 S.E. 684 (1919). 
6. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526,530 (1903); Brady v. Smith, 181 
N.Y. 178, 180, 73 N.E. 963, 964 (1905); Dunham v. Kirkpatrick, 101 Pa. 36, 44 (1882). 
7. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526, 530 (1903); Bumpus v. United 
States, 325 F.2d 264, 266 (10th Cir. 1963); Highland v. Commonwealth, 400 Pa. 261, 275, 
161 A.2d 390, 398 (1960). 
8. For a discussion of the nature of geothermal resources, the various types of geother- 
mal systems, and the technical problems involved in extracting geothermal resources, see 
Austin, Technical Overview of Geothermal Resources, 13 LAND & WATER L. REV. 9 (1977), 
and Sato & Crocker, Property Rights to Geothermal Resources (pt. I), 6 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
247, 253-70 (1977). 
9. See Kitchen, Geothermal Leasing Practices, 13 LAND & WATER L. REV. 25, 37-42 
(1977); Olpin, The Law of Geothermal Resources, 14 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 123, 129- 
33 (1968); Note, Acquisition of Geothermal Rights, 1 IDAHO L. REV. 49, 52-66 11964). 
10. [Tlhe United States Geological Survey has classified almost 60 million 
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have an enormous impact on the future development of energy 
in this country. 
The question was finally broached in Geothermal Kinetics, 
Inc. u. Union Oil Co. l1 The subject of the action in Geothermal 
Kinetics was a well located in a California geothermal field 
known as "The Geysers."12 In 1951 the owners in fee had conveyed 
to Geothermal Kinetics' predecessor in interest all the mineral 
rights in the property. In 1963, the holders of the surface, unaware 
of the earlier severance, leased to Union Oil's assignors the right 
to "drill for, produce, extract, remove and sell steam and steam 
power and extractable minerals" from the land. Geothermal Ki- 
netics brought an action to quiet its title in the geothermal re- 
sources and obtained a judgment in its favor.13 On appeal that 
judgement was affirmed, the court holding that, absent any ex- 
pressed specific intent to the contrary, the general grant of miner- 
als included the geothermal resources.14 
In reaching that conclusion, the California Court of Appeals 
rejected what it called a "mechanistic approach based upon text- 
book definitions of the term mineral."15 Instead, the court applied 
both a constructional approach-examining the language used in 
the specific conveyance-and a functional approach-attempting 
to discern the intent of the parties by resorting to their general 
expectations regarding the use of their respective estates.16 The 
Geothermal Kinetics court also relied heavily on the nature of the 
particular geothermal system in question. That system is known 
as a hot water system, since the energy is extracted in the form 
of superheated water. The geothermal water and the ground 
acres of Federal land in the 14 Western States as having a geothermal potential. 
There is, in addition, State and private land with a geothermal potential and 
very tentative estimates speak of a total of 100 million acres which might con- 
tain geothermal resources. 
Geothermal Energy: Hearings on H. R. 8628 and H. R. 9658 Before the Subcomm. on 
Energy of the H ~ u s e  Comm. on Science and Astronautics, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 24 (1973) 
(statement of Dr. Joseph Barnea). 
11. 75 Cal. App. 3d 56, 141 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1977). There are two other cases dealing 
with ownership of geothermal resources arising out of the same geothermal field. The first, 
United States v. Union Oil Co., 549 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 930 (1977), 
involved the ownership of geothermal resources under a reservation of minerals by the 
federal government. The second, Pariani v. State, No. 657291 (Super. Ct. of San Francisco 
City and County, June 30, 1977), dealt with a mineral reservation by the state govern- 
ment. 
12. 75 Cal. App. 3d at 58,141 Cal. Rptr. a t  879. All facts are derived from the opinion. 
13. Geothermal Kinetics, Inc. v. Union Oil Co., No. 75314, (Super. Ct. for the County 
of Sonoma, Cal., June 1, 1976). 
14. 75 Cal. App. 3d 56, 141 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1977). 
15. Id. at 59, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 880. 
16. Id. 
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water in that system are almost totally separated by a semi- 
impermeable silicacarbonate seal 1,000 feet thick." The geother- 
mal water taken from the wells contains toxic minerals, making 
it unfit for agricultural or domestic uses.18 The court emphasized 
these facts in holding that the ownership of the percolating water 
was insufficient to give the surface owner an interest in the geo- 
thermal water. The court reasoned that possession of the geo- 
thermal waters was not necessary to the enjoyment of the surface 
and therefore the parties must not have intended that they be 
part of the surface estate. 
The approach taken by the court in Geothermal Kinetics was 
consistent with that taken by courts in past attempts to define 
the scope of the mineral estate. Traditionally, courts have framed 
the problem of categorizing a substance whose value has recently 
been discovered as one of ascertaining the intent of the parties to 
the conveyance that originally severed the surface and the miner- 
als. Taking this tack, the real issue is whether the parties in- 
tended to include the particular substance within the mineral 
estate. However, the notion that the parties intended to include 
a resource within a general grant of minerals is in most cases 
absurd; indeed, it is probable that "as a matter of fact, the parties 
had nothing specific in mind on the matter at all."19 In the ab- 
sence of any apparent intent relating to a specific substance, the 
duty of the court verges on speculating what the parties would 
have intended on the point, had it been present in their minds.20 
To aid in this attempt the courts have developed a variety of rules 
and devices, most of which focus heavily on the facts of the par- 
ticular mineral deposit and take the same constructional and 
functional approaches used by the Geothermal Kinetics court. 
I t  is likely that other courts confronted with the task of allo- 
cating geothermal resources to the surface or mineral estate will 
turn to these traditional tools in much the same way as did the 
court in Geothermal Kinetics. This would be unfortunate, for it 
17. Id. at 59-60, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 880-81. 
18. Id. at 60, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 881. 
19. Kuntz, The Law Relating to Oil and Gas in Wyoming, 3 WYO. L.J. 107,112 (1949). 
20. In so doing, the function of the court becomes something akin to the interpreta- 
tion of statutes. The classic words of John Chipman Gray are pertinent on that subject: 
[TI he difficulties of so-called interpretation arise when the Legislature has had 
no meaning at all; when the question which is raised on the statute never 
occurred to it; when what the judges have to do is, not to determine what the 
Legislature did mean on a point which was present to its mind, but to guess 
what it would have intended on a point not present to its mind, if the point had 
been present. 
J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 173 (2d ed. 1938). 
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could result in extensive litigation with irregular and unpredicta- 
ble holdings, and it could unreasonably delay development of this 
badly needed resource. A preferable alternative would be a legis- 
lative determination of whether geothermal resources are pre- 
sumptively included within the surface or the mineral estate. 
This Comment will first identify policy objecives that should 
be considered in deciding the issue of geothermal ownership. 
Next, it will evaluate the adequacy, in the geothermal context, 
of several traditional approaches courts have taken in defining 
the mineral estate. It will then examine existing state geothermal 
resource statutes and evaluate their effectiveness in dealing with 
the classification problem. It will conclude by suggesting that 
policy objectives can best be achieved by a legislative allocation 
of geothermal resources to the mineral estate. 
In determining the issue of geothermal ownership, certain 
policy objectives must be considered. Perhaps the most impor- 
tant of these is that there be no unreasonable delay in the devel- 
opment of this much-needed resource. To accomplish this, title 
to geothermal resources must be quickly and inexpensively estab- 
lished in one party or another, not subject to alteration without 
clear and substantial grounds. The amount of investment re- 
quired to build, for example, an electrical generating plant pow- 
ered by geothermal energy is enorm~us,~' and a secure title is an 
absolute prerequisite to such an investment. 
A second related policy consideration is that the issue of 
ownership should be settled within the instruments available to 
the examiner of title. If questions of ownership can be settled only 
through extensive historical or geological investigation, complica- 
tion and delay are inevitable. Increasing the level of complication 
tends both to increase the number of disputes that are litigated 
and to decrease their degree of predictability. 
There is also a strong interest in giving effect to the inten- 
tions of the parties. Thus, if the owner of property expresses a 
desire to include geothermal resources within one estate or the 
21. One author has estimated that a minimum of ten geothermal wells is required to 
sustain a 55 megawatt power plant. Kitchen, supra note 9, at 31. The cost of drilling the 
well on the property in dispute in Geothermal Kinetics was about $400,000. 75 Cal. App. 
3d at 58, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 880. Thus, assuming the cost of that well to be about average, 
the cost of simply drilling enough wells to provide energy for a power plant is $4 million. 
This does not include any costs for acquiring the property or for constructing the power 
plant and the connecting pipelines. 
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other, that desire should be respected. However, this policy 
should be weighed against the objectives of certainty of ownership 
and expeditious development. When balanced in this manner, it 
is obvious that only when the owner has expressed an actual 
intent regarding geothermal ownership should the interest in giv- 
ing effect to the parties' intentions be controlling. The law should 
have no compulsion to use so-called intent tests to construe min- 
eral conveyances when the grantor actually had no intentions. 
In ascertaining the intentions of the parties many of the ear- 
lier courts took what may be called a definitional approach, in 
which they attempted to define precisely the word "mineral" and 
then determine whether the substance in question came within 
that definition. The definitional approach has now been widely 
discredited, due in large part to the Supreme Court's recognition 
that the term "mineral" has too many uses to be susceptible to 
precise del ineat i~n.~~ Most of the rules the courts now use in their 
22. See discussion accompanying note 4 supra. The definitional approach seems to 
have first evolved in England. In the case of Earl of Rosse v. Wainman, 153 Eng. Rep. 
724 (Ex. 1845), it was said that the term "mineral," "though more frequently applied to 
substances containing metals, in its proper sense includes all fossil bodies or matters dug 
out of mines." Id. at 730. Perhaps the best known English definition, one which was 
applied in several subsequent cases in both England and the United States, was articu- 
lated in Hext v. Gill, L.R. 7 Ch. 699 (Ch. App. 1872). 
[Tlhe result of the authorities, without going through them, appears to be this: 
that a reservation of "minerals" includes every substance which can be got from 
underneath the surface of the earth for the purpose of profit, unless there is 
something in the context or in the nature of the transaction to induce the Court 
to give it a more limited meaning. 
Id. at  712. 
Other early English definitions foreshadowing some of the more recent American 
attempts hold that "mineral" includes all substances of a mineral nature which have "a 
use and value of their own independent of their being constituents of the soil," Earl of 
Jersey v. Guardians, 22 Q.B.D. 555, 561 (1889), or define the term as encompassing 
"everything except the mere surface, which is used for agricultural purposes." Midland 
Ry. v. Checkley, L.R. 4 Eq. 19,25 (M.R. 1867). American opinions generally relied heavily 
on these English precedents, stating that "mineral" in a grant or reservation means "all 
mineral substances which can be taken from the land, and to  restrict the meaning of the 
term there must be qualifying language or circumstances evincing that the parties con- 
templated something less general than all substances legally cognizable as minerals." 
Kalberer v. Grassham, 282 Ky. 430, 433, 138 S.W.2d 940, 942 (1940) (citing Phelps v. 
Church of Our Lady, 115 F. 882 (3d Cir. 1902), and Kentucky Diamond Min. & Dev. Co. 
v. Kentucky Transvaal Diamond Co., 141 Ky. 97, 132 S.W. 397 (1910)). 
The decline of the definitional approach was signaled by the Supreme Court's recog- 
nition that the term "mineral" was used in too many senses to allow for a single definitive 
legal meaning. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. Soderberg, 188 U S .  526,530 (1903). The contem- 
porary treatment of the courts is either to reject outright the idea that there is a definite 
class of substances which are "minerals," United States ex. rel. TVA v. Harris, 115 F.2d 
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attempt to discover intent may be classed as functional or as 
constructional. Both approaches aim ultimately a t  discerning in- 
tent, but by the use of different processes. The functional ap- 
proach focuses on the uses to which the resource in question may 
be put in relation to the expectations with which surface and 
mineral owners generally hold their separate estates. Two exam- 
ples of the functional approach are the discernment of a general 
intent based on the manner of enjoyment, and the examination 
of the form or location of the substance whose ownership is con- 
tested. The constructional approach, on the other hand, empha- 
sizes the language of the instrument of conveyance, seeking to 
discover in the words themselves a clue to the intentions of the 
parties. One example of the constructional approach often used 
in interpreting mineral conveyances is the rule of ejusdem ge- 
neris. A third approach used by only a few courts is to examine 
the historical circumstances a t  the time of the conveyance. Under 
this historical approach, a major concern of the court is whether 
the substance in question was commonly known and commer- 
cially exploited in the general vicinity at the time of the severance 
of the two estates. These different approaches will be examined 
in turn and evaluated in terms of their adequacy in defining the 
ownership of geothermal resources. 
A. The Functional Approach 
1. General intent based on manner of enjoyment 
The idea of determining the scope of the mineral estate by 
seeking the parties' general intent based on the manner of enjoy- 
ment is probably the result of Professor Kuntz' important work, 
The Law Relating to Oil and Gas in Wyoming." Addressing the 
question whether oil and gas should be included within a general 
grant or reservation of minerals, he said: 
I t  is submitted that an intention test is the proper one, but not 
as applied heretofore. The intention sought should be the 
343 (5th Cir. 1940), or to find that the use of the word is per se ambiguous, thus allowing 
an examination of the transaction itself. Besing v. Ohio Valley Coal Co., 155 Ind. App. 
527, 293 N.E.2d 510 (1973). 
The surface owners in Geothermal Kinetics contended for a definitional approach, 
arguing that a mineral must have physical substance. 75 Cal. App. 3d at 58-59, 141 Cal. 
Rptr. at 880. Since the resource was not steam, rock, or the underground reservoir but heat 
energy, they contended, geothermal energy should not come within the definition of the 
word "mineral." The court summarily rejected this approach as "mechanistic" and in- 
stead adopted functional and constructional approaches. Id. at 59, 141 Cal. Rptr. a t  880. 
23. Kuntz, supra note 19. 
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general intent rather than any supposed but unexpressed 
specific intent, and, further, that general intent should be ar- 
rived at, not by defining and re-defining the terms used, but by 
considering the purposes of the grant or reservation in terms of 
manner of enjoyment intended in the ensuing  interest^.^^ 
Kuntz believed that enjoyment of the mineral estate was 
"through extraction of valuable substances" while the surface 
owner enjoyed his estate "through retention of such substances 
as are necessary for the use of the surface."25 His definition of 
general intent would sever from the surface "all substances pres- 
ently valuable in themselves, apart fom [sic] the soil, whether 
their presence is known or not, and all substances which become 
valuable."26 Substances whose removal would unreasonably in- 
terfere with the enjoyment of the surface could not be removed 
without compensation. 
  his general intent approach was adopted by the Tenth Cir- 
cuit in Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds.27 The question 
before the court in that case was whether helium was included in 
a lease of the "oil and gas, casinghead gas and casinghead gaso- 
line."2s The court agreed that the specific intent of the lessors was 
probably to convey only the combustible gases, but held that the 
controlling issue was whether the court should look to the specific 
or general intent of the lessors. On that issue, the court decided 
that 
general intent is closer to original intent than is specific intent 
which blossoms when a component previously regarded as an 
impurity becomes valuable. The discovery of the use and value 
of a component does not expand the grant but the expansion of 
that discovery into tangible value makes more certain the spe- 
cific object of the general grant. We conclude that, absent spe- 
cific reservations, the grant of gas by the leases covered all com- 
ponents of the gas, including helium.2g 
The general intent approach was used in the leading case 
defining geothermal rights under federal mineral reservations, 
United States v. Union Oil Co? The question in Union Oil was 
24. Id. at 112 (emphasis in original). 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 113. 
27. 441 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1971). 
28. Id. at 710. 
29. Id. at 715. 
30. 549 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 930 (1977). The court in 
Geothermal Kinetics properly recognized that the holding in Union Oil was not dispositive 
of the issue of geothermal ownership derived from a private conveyance. 75 Cal. App. 3d 
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whether the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 191631 reserved the 
rights to geothermal resources for the federal government. The 
lands patented under that act were "subject to . . . a reservation 
to the United States of all the coal and other minerals."32 The 
court found that "Congress's [sic] general purpose was to trans- 
fer to private ownership tracts of semi-arid public land capable 
of being developed by homesteaders into self-sufficient agricul- 
tural units . . . but to retain subsurface resources, particularly 
mineral fuels, in public ownership for conservation and subse- 
quent orderly disposition in the public interest."" Because of this 
general intent, the court held the geothermal resources had been 
reserved by the federal government. 
The court in Geothermal Kinetics utilized the parties' gen- 
eral intent based on manner of enjoyment to determine that 
geothermal resources were part of the mineral estate: "Since nor- 
mally the owner of the mineral estate seeks to extract valuable 
resources from the earth, whereas the surface owner generally 
desires to utilize land and such resources as are necessary for his 
enjoyment of the land, the geothermal resources should follow the 
mineral estate."34 
Despite its apparent popularity with the courts, the general 
intent method of determining geothermal ownership does not 
lead to consistent and predictable results. One problem with this 
method can be seen in the confusion over the ownership of water, 
the medium through which geothermal heat energy is in most 
instances extracted. While on the one hand, "water itself . . . 
may be classified as 'minerals,' "35 on the other "[nlo authority 
at 58 n.1, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 880 n.1. The two cases are different because the presumption 
regarding federal land grants is that they must be construed strictly in favor of the 
government and nothing is passed but what is conveyed in clear and explicit language. 
Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Prods. Co., 98 S. Ct. 2002, 2010 (1978); United States v. 
Union Pac. R.R., 353 U.S. 112, 116 (1957); Caldwell v. United States, 250 U.S. 14, 20-21 
(1919). In contrast, the general rule with private conveyances is that the conveyance is 
construed mast strongly against the grantor. Geothermal Kinetics, Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 
75 Cal. App. 3d at  59, 141 Cal. Rptr. a t  880; Clevenger v. Continental Oil Co., 149 Colo. 
417, 369 P.2d 550 (1962); Wilkes-Barre Township School Dist. v. Corgan, 403 Pa. 383, 170 
A.2d 97 (1961). The central issues in the cases were also different. The "substantial 
question" in Union Oil was whether interpreting the mineral reservation of the Stock- 
Raising Homestead Act to encompass geothermal resources "would further Congress's 
[sic] purposes." 549 F.2d a t  1274. There was no question of legislative intent in 
Geothermal Kinetics but only the problem of construing a conveyance between private 
parties. 
31. 43 U.S.C. $8 291-302 (1970). 
32. 43 U.S.C. § 299 (1970). 
33. 549 F.2d at  1274. 
34. 75 Cal. App. 3d at 59, 141 Cal. Rptr. a t  880. 
35. United States v. Union Oil Co., 549 F.2d at 1273-74. See also Andrus v. Charle- 
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need be cited to support the proposition that courts have held 
traditionally that water, surface and underground, belongs to the 
surface owner where the mineral and surface rights have been 
separated into different  ownership^."^^ It may be argued, as it was 
in Geothermal Kinetics, that water that is of no value to the use 
and enjoyment of the surface belongs to the mineral owner. This 
argument, however, would make the ownership of geothermal 
water dependent upon the uses for which it was or was not fit. For 
example, if the geothermal waters were potable, as they are in 
I~eland,~'  and thus could be used for culinary and irrigation pur- 
poses, the "use and enjoyment of the surface" argument would 
cut in favor of the surface owner. If the waters were not pure when 
pumped from the earth, but could, with little effort or expense, 
be made suitable for agricultural use, it would again seem that 
the surface owner would have a strong position. Obviously, the 
question of ownership becomes more and more difficult as poten- 
tial uses become more varied and unusual.38 For example, the 
surface owner may intend to heat a greenhouse, warm his house, 
or open a public bathhouse. 
stone Stone Prods. Co., 98 S. Ct. 2002 (1978) (recognizing that water may be a "mineral" 
but holding that Congress did not intend to include it within the meaning of 30 U.S.C. § 
21a (1976)), rev'g 553 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1977); Hathorn v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 
194 N.Y. 326,87 N.E. 504 (1909) (holding that subterranean waters are a mineral irrespec- 
tive of the character and quality of salts and gases which may be in solution); Ambassador 
Oil Corp. v. Robertson, 384 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) (holding that salt water is 
part of the mineral estate), writ ref'd, n.r.e. Robertson v. Blackwell Zinc Co., 390 S.W. 
2d 472 (Tex. 1965). 
36. Geothermal Kinetics, Inc. v. Union Oil Co., No. 75314, slip op. a t  12 (Super. Ct. 
for the County of Sonoma, Cal., June 1, 1976). See also Mack Oil Co. v. Laurence, 389 
P.2d 955 (Okla. 1964); Vogel v. Cobb, 193 Okla. 64,141 P.2d 276 (1943); Fleming Founda- 
tion v. Texaco, Inc., 337 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960); Stephen Hays Estate v. 
Togliatti, 85 Utah 137, 38 P.2d 1066 (1934), all holding that water is not a part of the 
mineral estate. 
37. See Kitchen, supra note 9, a t  30. 
38. Kitchen, supra note 9, lists a number of actual and potential uses for geothermal 
energy besides the generation of electricity. 
In Klamath Falls, Oregon, over 400 shallow wells serve an estimated 10,000 
persons by providing low temperature water for heating residential and commer- 
cial structures. The entire campus of the Oregon Institute of Technology in 
Klamath Falls is heated by one geothermal well, a use that saves the Institute 
an estimated $225,000 a year on its heating bills. 
Geothermal resources also are used for space heating and greenhouse heat- 
ing in Boise, Idaho, Reno-Steambbat Springs, Nevada, and Susanville, Califor- 
nia and the use of geothermal resources is being investigated for thermal fish 
farming in Paso Robles, California, and greenhousing in Lakeview, Oregon, and 
Calistago, California. Soil warming to extend growing seasons, evaporation in 
sugar refining, water desalination, absorption refrigeration, mushroom growing 
and process drying of various materials are other uses that have been suggested. 
Id. a t  29-30 (footnotes omitted). 
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These difficulties present only part of the problem inherent 
in an approach focusing on utilization. Because the manner in 
which geothermal water may be used and enjoyed is dependent 
in large measure upon the nature of that water, especially its 
chemical content and its temperature, any approach based on 
utilization would introduce uncertainty and delay into the deter- 
mination of geothermal ownership. In the first place, information 
about the nature of the water may only be available after enor- 
mous sums of money have been expended in the drilling of a 
geothermal well. It would be extremely risky to drill a well if there 
were any doubt beforehand about who owned the resource. There 
would also be the problem of line-drawing, determining at  what 
point the water becomes too salty to be useful for irrigation pur- 
poses or a t  what degree the water is not hot enough to be a viable 
energy source,39 a concern which may be considered particular to 
the mineral ownerq40 Aside from questions of competency, the 
appropriateness of deciding issues of property ownership on the 
basis of the heat or salinity of the water seems doubtful. Thus, 
the problems inherent in making ownership dependent on the 
resource's uses are compounded by interrelated difficulties stem- 
ming from the variable nature of the geothermal water. The result 
is that the general intent method of determining mineral owner- 
ship will not produce the certainty and consistency which are 
much needed in the geothermal context. 
2. The form or location of the substance 
A second variant of the functional approach looks a t  the way 
in which the resource is situated or how it may be extracted. This 
method is frequently used in quarrying and strip-mining cases, 
either implicitly or e ~ p l i c i t l y . ~ ~  Perhaps the most dogmatic appli- 
39. In its Petition for a Hearing by the Supreme Court, Union Oil Company made 
this argument: 
Finally, Appellants wish to point out that if the subsurface water at  the 
Geysers were cool, certainly Respondent as the holder of the mineral right.s 
would not be allowed to extract the water. If this is so, then a t  what temperature 
does the water suddenly become "mineral"? Does it become "mineral" a t  50°C, 
100°C or 150°C? The Court of Appeal does not and, of course, cannot answer 
this question. As a result, the question of ownership of lower temperature geo- 
thermal waters is unresolved. 
Petition by Appellants for a Hearing by the Supreme Court a t  18, Geothermal Kinet,ics, 
Inc. v. Union Oil Co., Civil No. 40447 (Cal. December 27, 1977). 
40. The Geothermal Kinetics court seemed to assume that the extraction of energy 
is particularly the expectation of the mineral owner. 75 Cal. App. 3d a t  61-62, 141 Cal. 
Rptr. a t  881-82. 
41. See generally Annot., 70 A.L.R.3d 383 (1976). 
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cation of this method is in Texas, where it is now the well- 
established rule that whenever a substance lies so near the sur- 
face that its extraction requires the consumption or destruction 
of the surface, it is not a mineral for any purpose, regardless of 
at what depth additional deposits might be found, unless there 
has been specific mention by the parties of the substance in ques- 
The form and location of the particular geothermal system 
was a decisive factor in the outcome of Geothermal Kinetics. The 
court seemed particularly impressed that the silica seal, 1,000 
feet thick, effectively separated the groundwater from the geo- 
thermal water. This provided "a sound geologic basis for distin- 
guishing between the usual ground water system and geothermal 
waters."43 The court also emphasized that the method of extract- 
ing energy from the geothermal system was similar to methods 
used with substances traditionally thought of as part of the min- 
eral estate. 
The production of the energy from geothermal energy is analo- 
gous to the production of energy from such other minerals as 
coal, oil and natural gas in that substances containing or capa- 
ble of producing heat are removed from beneath the earth. In 
fact, the wells used for the extraction of the steam are similar 
to oil and gas wells.44 
Thus, the decision in Geothermal Kinetics was based in large part 
on a functional approach emphasizing the way in which the re- 
source was situated and how it was extracted. 
Deciding the ownership of geothermal resources by looking at 
their form or location or by comparing the method of extraction 
to other mineral extraction is a hazardous course to follow and 
may lead to irreconcilable results, delay, and, consequently, un- 
42. Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1977); Williford v. Spies, 530 S.W. 2d 127 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1975). 
This rule had its beginnings in Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971), where 
the Texas Supreme Court held that a conveyance of "the oil, gas and other minerals" did 
not convey an interest in the iron ore located near the surface which could be removed 
only by methods that would destroy the surface. While the court recognized that iron ore 
is a mineral with commercial value, it  took the general intent approach advocated by 
Professor Kuntz and found that the parties to a severance of the surface and mineral 
estates would not ordinarily contemplate the uncompensated destruction of the surface 
for the benefit of the mineral estate. Id. a t  352. While the Acker v. Guinn opinion was 
framed as an attempt to ascertain the intent of the parties, the process of stare decisis 
has transformed it into a rule of Texas property law to be applied without respect to the 
general intentions of the parties. 
43. 75 Cal. App. 3d at 63, 141 Cal. Rptr. a t  883. 
44. Id. a t  60, 141 Cal. Rptr. a t  881. 
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certain ownership.45 Requiring "a sound geologic basis" upon 
which to determine ownership may delay resolution of ownership 
conflicts until the wells are drilled to obtain that information. 
And, while it is true that geothermal energy is often extracted by 
drilling wells similar to oil and gas wells, it is also true that 
normal subsurface water is similarly extracted by drilling wells 
and many geothermal resources, such as geysers and natural hot 
springs, can be utilized without drilling. 
B. The Constructional Approach-Ejusdem Generis 
The constructional approach focuses on finding the intent of 
the parties from the words used in the instrument severing the 
surface and mineral estates. One commonly used application of 
the constructional approach is the rule of ejusdem g e n e r i ~ . ~ ~  
When used to ascertain the scope of a grant of minerals, the rule 
requires that a general term (such as "other minerals") following 
one or more specific terms (such as "oil and gas" or "oil, gas, and 
coal") be limited to minerals of the same species or class as those 
specifically listed. Thus, the critical determination under this 
rule is whether the substance in question falls within the same 
class or species as those substances specifically listed; the out- 
come usually turns on what factors the court emphasizes when 
making its classification. 
This can be seen in the case of Vogel v. Cobb." There, under- 
ground water was found not to be of the same species as coal, oil, 
petroleum, gas, and asphalt. The court reasoned that the listed 
minerals were of similar chemical composition, existed in limited 
amounts, were ordinarily extracted from the earth and sold for 
profit, and served no useful function in connection with the use 
and enjoyment of the surface.4R Water, on the other hand, was of 
quite a different chemical composition, was not ordinarily 
thought of as valuable, and was necessary to the use of the sur- 
face. But the court could have reached the opposite result and 
found water to be of the same class as the named substances 
simply by considering other characteristics shared by water and 
45. "The form in which energy exists is without legal significance; otherwise, title to 
every resource would be uncertain . . . . [Tlhe development of any resource would be 
impeded and costly because of this cloud." Sato & Crocker, supra note 8, at 295. 
46. For a discussion of the rule of ejusdem generis, see generally Emery, What Surface 
Is Mineral and What Mineral Is Surface, 12 OKLA. L. REV. 499, 514-20 (1959). 
47. 193 Okla. 64, 141 P.2d 276 (1943). 
48. As can be seen in Vogel, the factors the court considers in applying the rule of 
ejusdem generis are often identical or similar to those emphasized by courts applying the 
general-intent-based-on-mode-of-enjoyment approach. 
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the named substances. For example, water, like the minerals 
named in the conveyance, is an underground resource; like oil and 
gas, it is often extracted by drilling wells; and like oil, it is com- 
monly found in a liquid state. 
Some factors a court might use in applying the rule of ejus- 
dem generis in a geothemal case include: the method of extrac- 
tion; the chemical composition; whether the resource is a gas, 
liquid, or solid; whether it is useful to the surface; and whether 
the energy is in chemical, heat, or other form. The outcome of the 
geothermal case would, as in other areas, turn upon which factors 
the court chose to emphasize. For example, in a case construing 
a conveyance of "oil, gas, and other minerals" in a fact situation 
similar to that in Geothermal Kinetics, the court could find that: 
(1) the method of extraction of geothermal energy is similar to 
that used for oil and gas; (2) the chemical composition of the 
extracted substance is very different from oil and gas; (3) the 
geothermal resource may be in liquid or gaseous form, much like 
oil and gas; (4) the geothermal resource may or may not be useful 
to the surface, depending on the naure of the water; and (5) the 
energy would be in the form of heat or pressure rather than in 
chemical form as in oil and gas. Thus, by focusing on the method 
of extraction, the form, and the lack of value to the surface, the 
court could conclude that the geothermal resources were of the 
same class as oil and gas. On the other hand, if the court empha- 
sized the chemical composition, the possible value of the water 
for normal surface uses, and the fact that the energy is in the form 
of heat, the result would be different. The uncertainty fostered by 
the use of the ejusdem generis rule would hinder the much- 
needed development of geothermal energy. This uncertainty 
raises an additional problem: the developer may be forced to 
secure leases from both the mineral and surface owner, increasing 
his costs and legal risks. 
C.  The Historical Approach 
Another method of determing the intended scope of the se- 
vered mineral estate is to examine the circumstances existing a t  
the time of the conveyance. Under this aproach, the fact that the 
particular substance had not been discovered or commercially 
produced in the vicinity a t  the time the deed was executed is 
often sufficient evidence to show that the parties did not intend 
to convey it." The rationale behind this approach is that if a 
49. This approach was first adopted in Deer Lake Co. v. Michigan Land & Iron Co., 
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substance was not popularly considered to be mineral, then the 
parties could not have intended to include it in a conveyance of 
the minerals, and if the substance was not even known to exist, 
then it could not have been popularly considered to be a min- 
eral?O 
[Wlhere there is ambiquity as to minerals actually embraced 
in instruments purporting to convey or to reserve certain un- 
specified minerals under generalized terms as to minerals, . . . 
the intent of the parties will be determined so as to be consistent 
with and limited to those minerals commonly known and recog- 
nized by legal or commercial usage in the area where the instru- 
ment was executed.51 
The historical approach has been most consistently em- 
braced in Arkansas cases, beginning in 1941 with Missouri Pacific 
Railroad v. S t roha~ke r .~~  The court in that case held that "in a 
country where oil and gas were not given the slightest commercial 
consideration in connection with land values,"" oil and gas would 
not be considered part of the mineral reservation. Since then the 
Arkansas courts have on occasion expressed some doubts as to the 
wisdom of the Strohacker decision, but have given it the weight 
of a rule of property.54 
89 Mich. 180, 50 N.W. 807 (1891). The issue in Deer Lake was whether marble and 
serpentine were included within a reservation of "minerals." Although recognizing that 
these substances would be included within a legal definition of "mineral," the court held 
that because iron ore was the only mineral known to exist in the locality a t  the time of 
the severance, only the iron ore had been reserved. Id. a t  186, 50 N.W. a t  809. Historical 
circumstances were also considered in Huie Hodge Lumber Co. v. Railroad Lands Co., 151 
La. 197, 91 So. 676 (1922), where the court held that oil and gas were not included within 
a mineral reservation, stating that a t  the time of the conveyance "petroleum and gas were 
unknown in this state, especially in the section where these lands are situated." Id. a t  200, 
91 So. a t  677. 
50. See Comment, The Meaning of "Minerals " in Grants and Reservations, 30 ROCKY 
MTN. L. REV. 343, 349 (1958). 
51. Ahne v. Reinhart & Donovan Co., 240 Ark. 691, 696, 401 S.W.2d 565, 569 (1966). 
52. 202 Ark. 645, 152 S.W.2d 557 (1941). 
53. Id. a t  656, 152 S.W.2d at  563. 
54. See Brizzolara v. Powell, 214 Ark. 870, 873,218 S.W.2d 728, 729-30 (1949), where 
the court explained: 
To this point we have assumed, as do the parties, that the rule of the 
Strohacker case governs the construction of the railway company's reservation. 
No attempt is made to impair the authority of that case, nor would the attempt 
be successful. The ruling was followed in Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Furqueron, 210 
Ark. 460, 196 S.W.2d 588, and Carson v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 212 Ark. 96'3,209 
S.W.2d 97, 1 A.L.R.2d 784, though with increasing dissents. But it has become 
a rule of property on which have been founded innumerable important transac- 
tions. To change the rule now would invalidate many titles acquired upon faith 
in the original decision. Consequently, regardless of our individual views as to 
the merits of the Strohacker rule, it is the unanimous opinion of the court that 
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Use of the historical approach in the geothermal context 
would create a number of problems. Perhaps the biggest difficulty 
would be in determining whether geothermal resources were 
known to exist or whether they were commercially exploited a t  
the time of the conveyance. While man has been aware of geother- 
mal energy for some 2,000 years,55 and has used hot springs for a 
variety of purposes since then, it was not until this century that 
electricity was produced from geothermal steam? The first com- 
mercial electric generating plant powered by geothermal energy 
in this country opened in 1960.57 Consequently, it may be difficult 
to determine without litigation in each jurisdiction whether, for 
example, the test of commercial exploitation would be satisfied 
by the use of warm geothermal springs for a commercial bathing 
establishment or whether only energy uses would suffice. It may 
even be suggested that the mere knowledge of the existence of hot 
water on the severed premises is enough. 
Another difficulty is that in many instances it would be 
nearly impossible for a title examiner to ascertain whether geo- 
thermal resources had been known to exist or had been commer- 
cially exploited on a given date in the distant past. Only histori- 
cal research, going far beyond the title records, would yield the 
answers. This could be very costly and time consuming, further 
delaying the development of geothermal resources. 
The extensive litigation in Arkansas spawned by the 
Strohacker ruleJ8 is evidence that the historical approach can lead 
it has become a rule of property which should not be disturbed. 
55. Bjorge, The Development of Geothermal Resources and the 1970 Geothermal 
Steam Act--Law in Search of Definition, 46 U .  COLO. L. REV. 1, 3 (1974). 
56. Id. 
57. Olpin, supra note 9, a t  124-25. 
58. The frustration caused by continued attempts to apply the Strohacker rule are 
seen in Ahne v. Reinhart & Donovan Co., 240 Ark. 691,401 S.W.2d 565 (1966) (McFaddin, 
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part): 
On this matter, of how to determine when oil and gas were recognized as 
minerals, we have drifted like a "ship without a rudder," as quotations from our 
cases will show. 
(a) We started out in the Strohacker case in 1941 by saying it was the 
intention of the grantor that determined the issue . . . . 
(b) Then, in the Furqueron case [210 Ark. 460, 196 S.W.2d 5881 in 1946, 
we quoted a headnote from the Strohacker case which included both the inten- 
tion of the grantor and the intention of the grantee in the deed . . . . 
(c) Then in the Carson case [212 Ark. 963, 209 S.W.2d 971 in 1948, we 
again tested the mineral question by the mutual intention of the parties . . . . 
(d) In the Brizzolara case [214 Ark. 870, 218 S.W.2d 7281 in 1949, we still 
tested the mineral question with the "intent with which the words were used," 
. . . . 
(e) But when we decided the Stegall case [228 Ark. 632, 310 S.W.2d 2511 
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to great uncertainty in the ownership of natural resources. I t  
would be senseless to use it in the geothermal context. 
D. Summary 
The conclusion that must be drawn from the above discus- 
sion is that the traditional devices for determining the scope of 
the mineral estate-the functional, constructional, and historical 
approaches-are ineffective in the geothermal context. The appli- 
cation of these approaches would almost certainly lead to pro- 
tracted and expensive litigation with inconsistent and unpredict- 
able results. This would delay development of this much-needed 
resource. It is therefore suggested that the question of geothermal 
ownership should be "resolved by resort to rule, rather than by a 
particularistic, case-by-case approach which falsely claims to dis- 
cover actual in ten t i~n ."~~ Because the courts are bound by the 
case method of resolving disputes and would likely rely on the 
traditional approaches, it is recommended that state legislatures 
take responsibility for laying down the rule. Legislatures may 
appropriately weigh the considerations of public policy and bal- 
ance the conflicting interests and values involved. A number of 
states already have legislation in the field of geothermal re- 
sources; these will now be examined to determine their effective- 
ness in dealing with the problem of geothermal ownership. 
IV. STATE GEOTHERMAL RESOURCES STATUTES 
A. Present Statutes 
At present, fifteen states have enacted legislation dealing 
specifically with some aspect of the geothermal resource area?' Of 
in 1958, we departed entirely from what the parties to the conveyance intended, 
and went to the test of what the word mineral was generally understood to mean 
at the time of the conveyance . . . . 
(f) And now, in the present case, we seem to be going to a county by 
county basis to determine when oil and gas became recognized as minerals 
. . . . 
. . . It now seems that there will have to be a case brought to this Court 
from each of the seventy-five counties in Arkansas to have determined when oil 
and gas were first generally recognized as a mineral, in each such county; and 
it is from that line of holdings that I must necessarily dissent. 
Id. at 698-700, 401 S.W.2d at 569-70 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). 
59. Halbach, Stare Decisis and Rules of Construction in Wills and Trusts, 52 CALIF. 
L. REV. 921, 923 (1964). 
60. Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.181 (1962); Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 27-651 to 
675 (1956 & Supp. 1977-78); California, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE $5  3700-3776 (West 1972 & 
Supp. 1978); Colorado, COW. REV. STAT. §§ 34-70-101 to 110 (Supp. 1977); ~ a w a i i ,  HAW. 
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these, seven have statutes arguably dealing with the question of 
ownership. For instance, Oregon's statute includes geothermal 
resources within the surface estate: 
Ownership rights to geothermal resources shall be in the owner 
of the surface property underlain by the geothermal resources 
unless such rights have been otherwise reserved or conveyed. 
However, nothing in this section shall divest the people or the 
state of any rights, title or interest they may have in geothermal 
 resource^.^^ 
This statute is an excellent example of what a state legisla- 
ture can do to clear up the quandary concerning the ownership 
of geothermal resources. There should be little doubt about the 
outcome of any litigation on the question, but better still, there 
should be little need for any such litigation. This certainty is sure 
to expedite the development of geothermal energy in Oregon. 
If any improvement of the statute is possible, it may be to 
make more explicit what language is effective to separate the 
geothermal ownership rights from the surface. This could be ac- 
complished by simply including the word "specifically" to modify 
"reserved or conveyed," so that the clause would read: "unless 
such rights have otherwise been specifically reserved or con- 
veyed." Such a change would make it crystal clear that anything 
short of specific mention of geothermal resources would not suf- 
fice to overcome the presumption that those resources belong to 
the surface owner. It would still allow the surface owner to trans- 
fer his geothermal property if he so desired, but would forestall 
the possible argument that reservation or transfer could be made 
by implication. This would further discourage litigation and so- 
lidify ownership. 
Idaho,62 Montana," and Washingtone4 have all declared that 
REV. STAT. $ 182-1 (1976); Idaho, IDAHO CODE $§  42-4001 to 4015 (1977); Louisiana, LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. $§ 30581.1-.5 (West Supp. 1978); Montana, Mom. REV. CODES ANN. $ 8  
81-2601 to 2613 (Supp. 1977); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. $ 4  534A.010-.040 (1973); New 
Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. $ 4  65-11-1 to 24 (Supp. 1977); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. $ 4  
522.005--.990 (Supp. 1977); Texas, TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. tit. 5, $$  141.001-.079 (Ver- 
non 1978); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. $ 73-1-20 (Supp. 1977); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. $ 9  79.76.010-.900 (Supp. 1977); Wyoming, WYO. STAT. $ 41-3-901(a)(ii) (1977). In 
addition, there is federal legislation on the subject. 30 U.S.C. § $  1001-1025 (1976). 
61. OR. REV. STAT. $ 522.035 (Supp. 1977). 
62. IDAHO CODE $ 42-4002(c) (1977). 
63. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. $ 81-2602 (Supp. 1977). That section states geothermal 
resources are "neither a mineral resource nor a water resource." Id. In another section, 
however, Montana includes "geothermal water" in its statutory definition of water. Id. $ 
89-867(1) (SUPP. 1977). 
64. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. $ 79.76.040 (Supp. 1977). 
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geothermal resources are sui generis. Idaho's statute, which is 
quite similar to the other two, reads as follows: 
Geothermal resources are found and hereby declared to be sui 
generis, being neither a mineral resource nor a water resource, 
but they are found and hereby declared to be closely related to 
and possibly affecting and affected by water and mineral re- 
sources in many  instance^.^^ 
These statutes presumably mean that geothermal resources, not 
being a "mineral resource," are in a class by themselves and 
would not be included within a grant or reservation of the miner- 
als absent a specific reference to them in the instrument. That 
they are the property of the surface owner seems to follow from 
the general rule that any part of the fee which has not been 
severed remains with the surface estate? Unfortunately these 
statutes are not as clear on this point as they could be. This may 
be because the purpose of these statutes was not to allocate the 
ownership of geothermal resources between the surface and min- 
eral estates, but rather to prevent geothermal resources from 
being entangled in the complicated body of law governing water 
and minerals in those states." To remove the possibility of misun- 
derstanding or uncertainty, it may be advisable for the legisla- 
tures of Idaho, Montana, and Washington to consider specifically 
the problem of geothermal ownership and to amend their statutes 
to create a presumption of ownership. 
The Hawaii statute dealing with the reservation by the gov- 
ernment of mineral rights states that geothermal resources come 
within the term "minerals" for purposes of such reservations. 
In this chapter, if not inconsistent with the context: (1) "Miner- 
als" means any or all of the oil, gas, coal, phosphate 
65. IDAHO CODE § 42-4002(c) (1977). 
66. This is often expressed in the Latin maxim cujus est solum, ejus est esque ad 
coelurn et ad inferos. In many states this common law principle has been codified. E.g., 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 829 (West 1972). The surface owners in Geothermal Kinetics advanced 
a similar argument, reasoning that since geothermal resources did not come within the 
definition of "minerals" and since the surface rights included everything except. the miner- 
als, they owned the geothermal resources. 75 Cal. App. 3d a t  59-60, 141 Cal. Rpt.r. a t  880. 
67. The advantage of declaring geothermal resources to be 
"of their own kind" is that the geothermal industry will not be bound by an 
anachronistic body of statutes and court decisions which have no valid relat.ion 
to present day technology and development of this new energy source. The issue 
of ownership (public or private, surface owner or mineral reservation holder) will 
be left to state legislatures and courts without being confined by the wat.er or 
mining laws, so long as no federal question is involved. 
Bjorge, supra note 55, a t  24. See also Kitchen, supra note 9, a t  42-45; Aidlin, Representing 
the Geothermal Resources Client, 19 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 27, 38-40 (1974). 
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. . . and, without limitation thereon, all other mineral sub- 
stances and ore deposits whether solid, gaseous, or liquid, in- 
cluding all geothermal resources, in, on, or under any land, fast 
or submerged . . . . 68 
This section is of limited value in construing private conveyances. 
While it may be argued that the statute reflects legislative intent 
concerning the resource in a general sense, the statute is not 
conclusive on this point and, consequently, will not reduce the 
likelihood of litigation. The Hawaii statute does not deal effec- 
tively with the problem of the allocation of geothermal resources 
among private parties. 
While Wyoming has no geothermal statute, it includes geo- 
thermal water within its definition of underground water." The 
statute in Nevada declares that "any water and steam encoun- 
tered during geothermal exploration is subject to the appropria- 
tion procedures" of the state water law.7o Thus, geothermal water 
in those states is subject to the rules that govern other water 
resources and its ownership is not based on the surface-mineral 
distinction. Unfortunately, the Wyoming and Nevada statutes 
make no provision for the mineral byproducts commonly found 
in geothermal water, so ownership to the resource as a whole is 
not settled. 
In the remaining states with geothermal resource stat- 
utes-Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Louisiana, New 
Mexico, Texas, and Utah-it may be possible to construct an 
argument that the legislature intended to include the resource 
within one estate or the other even though there is no specific 
reference to this point." A number of the states assign the super- 
68. HAW. REV. STAT. § 182-l(1) (1976). 
69. WYO. STAT. 41-3-901(a)(ii) (1977). 
70. NEV. REV. STAT. 8 534A.040 (1973). 
71. The Texas and New Mexico statutes suggest that the legislatures of those states 
believed that geothermal resources were included in the mineral estate. In the section of 
the Texas Civil Code which confers and defines the eminent domain powers of electrical 
generating entities, the following statement is made: 
[Njo participating entity has . . . the power to take land or any interest 
therein, by exercise of the power of eminent domain, for the purpose of drilling 
for, mining, or producing fro& said land, any oil, gas, geothermal, geother- 
mallgeopressured, lignite, coal, sulphuur, uranium, plutonium, or other miner- 
als belonging to another . . . . 
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1435a, # 4(2) (Vernon Supp. 1978). From this statute it 
could be inferred that the Texas Legislature has determined that geothermal resources are 
included within the mineral estate. I t  seems strange, however, that the legislature would 
have done this in such an oblique manner. 
The New Mexico statute has an even more tenuous suggestion that geothermal re- 
sources should be considered part of the mineral estate. The section of the geothermal 
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vision of geothermal development to a particular governmental 
department. Giving this responsibility to the oil and gas board72 
or the state water engineer,73 for example, may indicate that the 
legislature thought the resource was mineral (oil and gas board) 
or nonmineral (water engineer). Another argument is that the 
inclusion of the chapter on geothermal resources in one part or 
another of the state code indicates a legislative intent to include 
geothermal resources within the mineral or surface estate. Addi- 
tionally, some states specifically include within their statutory 
definition of geothermal resources minerals present in the geo- 
thermal water.74 Because it specifically mentions minerals, such 
a definition of geothermal resources may in bootstrap fashion give 
the mineral owner some claim to all of the geothermal resources. 
These arguments are unsettling because they fail to resolve 
the issue of geothermal ownership but do supply ammunition for 
the litigation that will be required to answer the question. State 
legislatures should speak directly to this problem instead of being 
satisfied with defining geothermal resources and delegating re- 
sponsibility for them to a particular administrative body. 
From this brief review of state geothermal resource statutes 
it is evident that only in Oregon is the rule unambiguously clear; 
in Idaho, Montana, and Washington the rule of ownership is 
probably apparent but could be made clearer; and in the remain- 
ing states with geothermal resource statutes, those statutes pro- 
vide no certainty as to the ownership of geothermal resources. In 
these latter states, and in the balance of the fifty states, the 
legislatures should be encouraged to establish by statute a gen- 
eral rule that geothermal resources are presumptively the prop- 
erty of either the surface owner or the mineral owner, as Oregon 
has done.75 
resources chapter allowing or  requiring a spacing unit for geothermal wells bears the 
heading "Spacing unit with divided mineral ownership." N.M. STAT. ANN. 4 65-11-13 
(Supp. 1975). Nothing in the remainder of the section suggests that geothermal resources 
are minerals, so any indication of legislative intent must be drawn solely from the heading. 
Even though the heading was part of the original legislative enactment, its reference t.o 
mineral ownership was probably only a slip and nothing should be implied from it. 
72. This is the approach taken by Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 27-652 (1956); Califor- 
nia, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE 9 3700 (West 1972); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. 4 34-70-102 
(Supp. 1977); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 65-11-2 (Supp. 1975); and Texas, TEX. 
NAT. RES. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 141.011 (Vernon 1978). 
73. This is the approach taken by Utah. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-20 (Supp. 1977). 
74. E.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. 8 65-11-3 (Supp. 1975): " '[Gleothermal resources' means 
. . . all minerals in solution or other products obtained from naturally heated fluids, 
brines, associated gases and steam, in whatever form, found below the surface of the earth, 
but excluding oil, hydrocarbon gas and other hydrocarbon substances." 
75. The establishment of such a rule may be followed by a challenge of the statute 
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B. Future Legislation 
Although the courts' traditional approaches are ineffective in 
settling geothermal ownership without unacceptable delay, un- 
certainty, and expense, they do help to identify many factors 
legislatures should take into account in drafting a statutory pre- 
sumption of ownership. A conscientious analysis of these factors 
in the geothermal context leads most naturally to the conclusion 
that  the presumption should favor the mineral owner, and it is 
recommended that state legislatures adopt this position. Any res- 
olution of the question, however, is preferable to none, and clear 
and unambiguous legislation giving the surface owner the rights 
to geothermal energy would also avoid the evils of ad hoc judicial 
 determination^.^" 
State legislatures should consider that geothermal resources, 
like mineral substances, are usually found underground. While 
some subsurface resources have been held not to be a part of the 
mineral estate,77 as a general rule the mineral estate includes all 
underground substances of value.7R Additionally, most geother- 
mal fluids contain large amounts of extractable minerals. A 
strong argument can be made that these mineral byproducts are 
on due process grounds by the party disfavored by the presumption. Such a challenge 
would be unlikely to succeed. The property of which the claimant would be deprived, 
without language specifically granting or reserving the geothermal resources, is only t.he 
expectation that, under common law rules, he may be awarded the geothermal resources 
by a court. The property owner will not be heard to complain if the common law is changed 
by statute, for "no one has a vested right in any particular rule of the common law." Truax 
v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 329 (1921). Furthermore, within the meaning of the f0urteent.h 
amendment, "a deprivation of property without due process of law occurs when it. results 
from the arbitrary exercise of power, inconsistent with 'those settled usages and modes of 
proceeding existing in the common and statute law of England before the emigration of 
our ancestors.' " Tracy v. Ginzberg, 205 U.S. 170, 178 (1907) (emphasis added). Because 
there are reasonable grounds upon which a legislature may establish a rule of ownership, 
such a classification cannot be termed an arbitrary exercise of power, and consequently, 
laying down a rule that geothermal resources are within the surface or mineral estate is 
not a deprivation of property without due process. 
76. The Oregon statute, of course, creates a presumption in favor of the surface 
owner. To date there are no reported opinions in Oregon challenging that. st.at.ut.e or 
questioning the rights of surface owners to geothermal resources. 
One advantage of giving the surface owner the rights to georthermal energy is that. 
such an allocation may promote the application of geothermal resources for space heating 
and other agricultural and domestic uses. This would be especially true in cases where 
the lower temperature of the water or other circumstances make impractical the const.ruc- 
tion of an electrical generating plant. 
77. Subterranean water is often said not to be included within the mineral estate, 
although the decisions are not consistent. See notes 35-36 and accompanying text supra. 
78. See, e.g., Sellars v. Ohio Valley Trust Co., 248 S.W.2d 897 (Ky. 1952); Acker v. 
Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348,352 (Tex. 1971); Humphreys-Mexia Co. v. Gammon, 113Tex. 247, 
254 S.W. 296 (1923); Sult v. A. Hochstetter Oil Co., 63 W. Va. 317, 61 S.E. 307 (1908). 
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the property of the mineral owner.7g It would greatly simplify 
questions of ownership if the rights to all underground resources, 
especially those containing mineral byproducts, were the prop- 
erty of the mineral owner. 
State legislatures should also take into account the fact that 
the production of geothermal resources is very similar to the pro- 
duction of oil and gas, substances now generally considered min- 
erals. Geothermal resources, like oil and gas, are in most cases 
attractive for use as an energy source. The predominant method 
for extracting geothermal resources is through the drilling of 
wells, using techniques similar to oil and gas e x t r a c t i ~ n . ~ ~  Many 
states already regulate the development of geothermal energy by 
spacing and unit izat i~n,~ '  concepts adapted from oil and gas law. 
Furthermore, it has been held that owners of geothermal wells 
qualify for the oil and gas depletion allowance under federal in- 
come tax l awd2  These strong similarities suggest that the min- 
eral owner should possess the ownership rights to the geothermal 
resources. 
Finally, it must be recognized that, because it is the only 
decision on the issue whether geothermal resources belong to the 
mineral owner or the surface owner, the Geothermal Kinetics case 
will undoubtedly have an enormous impact on the development 
of geothermal resources law. Because of this influence, an ap- 
proach consistent with the Geothermal Kinetics holding will be 
less likely to be challenged in the courts and will thus yield more 
stability to the law. Future state statutes should establish the 
presumption that geothermal resources are the property of the 
owner of the mineral estate. 
There is an immediate need for the development of geother- 
79. Not only are these minerals underground substances of value, they are also ele- 
ments commonly considered minerals. For instance, the water taken from the Geothermal 
Kinetics well contains aluminum, copper, chromium, iron, lead, magnesium, manganese, 
mercury, nickel, zinc, and sulfur. Geothermal Kinetics, Inc. v. Union Oil Co., No. 75314, 
slip op. a t  8 (Super. Ct. for the County of Sonoma, Cal., June 1, 1976). But see Stephen 
Hays Estate v. Togliatti, 85 Utah 137, 38 P.2d 1066 (1934), which held that the surface 
owner was entitled to surface water containing copper in solution. The copper came from 
tailings abandoned by upstream miners, and was obtained by a precipitation process. 
80. See generally Geothermal Kinetics, Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 75 Cal. App. 3d at 60, 
141 Cal. Rptr. a t  881; Olpin, supra note 9, a t  128. 
81. E.g., Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. 5 34-70-104 (Supp. 1977); New Mexico, N.M. 
STAT. ANN. $ 5  65-11-11, 12-13 (Supp. 1975); Texas, TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. tit. 5, 5 
141 .O78 (Vernon 1978). 
82. Reich v. Commissioner, 454 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1972). 
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ma1 resources, especially as an alternative energy source. To meet 
that need, the question of the ownership of this resource must be 
settled quickly and definitively. Reliance on the courts and their 
traditional approaches will not achieve the objectives of certainty 
of ownership and expeditious development; instead, confusion 
and delay will be the result. With one exception, the state legisla- 
tures have not dealt effectively with this problem. The legisla- 
tures should establish a general rule that geothermal resources 
are presumptively within one estate or the other when the miner- 
als have been severed from the surface. This presumption should 
be overcome only by specific and direct language expressing a 
contrary intention. Because including geothermal resources 
within the mineral estate would simplify questions of ownership 
of underground resources, would reflect the strong similarity be- 
tween geothermal resources and oil and gas, and would be consis- 
tent with the holding in Geothermal Kinetics, it is suggested that 
the legislative presumption favor the mineral owner. 
Scott  M. Farnsworth 
